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A CHANGING MOSAIC IN SEC REGULATION AND
ENFORCEMENT: BROKER-DEALERS AND INVESTMENT
ADVISERS
Douglas M Branson

I. INTRODUCTION
Bernie Madoff was an investment adviser registered with the SEC
pursuant to provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.1 He was
subject to across-the-board fiduciary standards.2 Yet Madoff embezzled
$17 billion, or more, from his clients. 3
R. Allen Stanford, too, was a registered investment adviser. He was
subject to across-the-board fiduciary standards. He embezzled over $7
billion from investors in his enterprise.4
By contrast, broker-dealers, at least rank-and-files ones, are not
subject to fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Without more-such as
making a representation or holding oneself out-a broker is not a
fiduciary when giving personalized investment advice and making
recommendations. But brokers do not commit large and glaring frauds
such as those Madoff and Stanford perpetrated, or at least they have not
done so in recent times.
Brokers may be subject to several discrete commands such as those
emanating from the suitability ("know thy customer") 5 and basis ("know
thy security") 6 doctrines as well as the dictates of the shingle theory (by
1. Section 202(a)(1 1) of the Investment Advisers Act defines investment adviser to include
"any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others ... as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or who ... issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2012). Thus
both private wealth managers and publishers of market letters such as Value Line are included. Brokers
are not if their advisory services are "solely incidental" to their securities business and they receive "no
special compensation" for rendition of the advice. Id. § 80b-2(a)( 11)(C).
2. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
3. See Leslie Wayne, Madoff Case Puts Harsh Light on Investment Advisers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
4, 2009, at B4. Early reports were that Madoff s scheme had made $50 billion disappear. See Diana B.
Henriques, Madoff Scheme Kept Rippling Outward, Crossing Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at
Al; Frank Rich, Eight Years ofMadoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at WKl0.
4. Compare Daniel Gilbert & Jean Eaglesham, Stanford Hit with 110 Years, WALL ST. J., June
15, 2012, at Cl ($7 billion), with Steve Stecklow, Hard Sell Drove Stanford'sRise and Fall, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 3, 2009, at Al ($8 billion).
5. FINRA Rule 2111(a) provides in part that a broker-dealer "must have a reasonable basis to
believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy . . . is suitable for the customer, based
upon the information obtained through the reasonable diligence of the [broker-dealer] to ascertain the
customer's
investment
profile."
FINRA
R.
2111(a),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/displaymain.html?rbid=2403&recordid=13390.
6. See, e.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969). See generally JAMES COX, ROBERT
HILLMAN & DONALD LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION 1035-40 (5th ed. 2006).
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hanging out your shingle you impliedly promise to treat your customers
honestly and fairly).7 But the shingle theory is as close as regulation has
come, at least historically, to imposing an across-the-board, gap-filling
standard such as fiduciary duties.
Now comes the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, better known as the Dodd-Frank Act, which has now been
enacted.9 Dodd-Frank does many things and is over 700 pages long,
but for purposes of this Essay one section, Section 913, is particularly
relevant. Section 913 requires the SEC to study and report on whether
the Commission should impose an across-the-board fiduciary standard
on brokers similar to that applicable to investment advisers. The Section
further grants to the SEC the authority to adopt such a standard should
the Commission decide to do so. 10 The SEC staff conducted a study on
this issue, rendering a 166 page report to the Commission in January
2011.11
Predictably perhaps, the study recommended that the Commission
impose such a standard.12 More than two years later, the SEC
announced that it would promulgate the first draft of proposed rules on
or about March 31, 201313 but, as this Essay nears completion, no
proposed SEC rule has been forthcoming.
The purpose of this Essay is not to predict and then foretell
consequences of the Commission's probable actions, specifically
whether enhanced standards will promote public and private
enforcement. The purpose of this Essay also is not to rehash all the
7. See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
786 (1944). See generallyCox, supra note 6, at 1032-35. FINRA's rules contain a "broad, generalized
ethical provision" similar to the common law shingle theory. James S. Wrona, The Best ofBoth Worlds:
A Fact-Based Analysis of the Legal Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and a
Frameworkfor EnhancedInvestor Protection,68 Bus. LAW. 1, 32 (2012). FINRA Rule 2010 states that
a broker-dealer "in the conduct of its business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and
available at
R.
2010,
trade."
FINRA
principles
of
and
equitable
just
http://fmra.complinet.comlen/display/display.htmlrbid=2403&elementid=5504.
8. See notes and accompanying text infra.
9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376-2223 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
10. Id. §913(g).
11. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
at
STUDY],
available
IA/BD
(2011)
[hereinafter
BROKER-DEALERS
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
12. "[R]etail customers should be protected uniformly when receiving personalized investment
Therefore, this Study recommends that the
advice or recommendations about securities ....
Commission exercise its rulemaking authority to adopt and implement. . . the uniform fiduciary
standard of conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers when providing personalized investment
advice about securities to retail customers." Id. at 165.
13. See Stephen Joyce & Yin Wilczek, SEC to Issue Unified FiduciaryStandard Guidance in
Q1, SIFMA's Bentsen Says, SEC. L. DAILY, Jan. 18, 2013. As of the date this is being submitted to the
University of Cincinnati Law Review, the SEC has not promulgated proposed rules.
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arguments pro and con for imposition of such a standard. Very able
scholars have argued the issues, in exhaustive fashion.14
Rather this Essay seeks to draw on my twenty years' experience as a
FINRA (formerly NASD) arbitrator of customer-broker disputes; as an
expert witness in countless arbitrations; as a litigator or consultant in
court cases; and as counsel to compliance officers at several smaller and
midsized financial services firms. As a legal scholar, I have also written
about the financial services industry and individual investors.15
The upshot? Imposition of a fiduciary, or similar, standard on
broker-dealers will not add much, or not nearly as much as observers
believe, for several reasons:
* Because of the way brokers are compensated, which is not likely
to change;
* Because of the futility of attempting by regulation to curb the
uncurbable (striving for larger pieces of the compensation pie) in
human nature;
* Because of the numerous conflicts of interest occasioned by the
creation of diversified financial services firms, and engagement
by those firms in cross-selling, determined to ram the "one-stop
financial shopping" concept down consumers' throats;
* Because those conflicts will not go away simply because of the
adoption of a newer, more exacting standard;
* Because brokers frequently are fiduciaries in many more
instances than have heretofore been recognized; and
* Because of the relative powerlessness of financial firms'
compliance officers and their efforts, the new standard will
receive much less attention where it counts. Such compliance
officers' efforts are the front line, the boots on the ground so-tospeak, in enforcement of any new standard, and if history is our
guide compliance officers and departments will at most give lip
service to the new regime.
14. Two excellent pieces are Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why
Brokers Should be Fiduciaries,87 WASH. L. REv. 707 (2012) [hereinafter Laby, Selling Advice], and
Wrona, supra note 7(reviewing current standards and leaning against imposition of new requirements).
See also Arthur B. Laby, FiduciaryObligationsof Broker-Dealersand Investment Advisers, 55 ViLL. L.
REv. 701 (2010).
15. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Securities Regulation After Entering the Competitive Era:
The Securities Industry, SEC Policy and the IndividualInvestor, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 857 (1980).
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Ah, though, the yin and the yang. Adoption of a new standard will
add some new things and fill some gaps here and there. In the
penultimate Part, this Essay also will attempt to outline several possible
new additions brought about under a new standard. But rather than
preview what those items may be, this Essay begins with a brief reprise
of the past.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Dodd-FrankSection 913
The Section begins simply enough, ordering the SEC to conduct a
study with two aims in mind.
First, the Commission shall study "the effectiveness of existing legal
or regulatory standards of care for brokers, dealers, investment
advisers ... and persons associated ... for providing personalized
investment advice and recommendations about securities to retail
customers ... ."16
Second, the Commission shall study "whether there are legal or
regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps in legal or regulatory
standards in the protection of retail customers relating to the standards
of care .. . ."
Third, the Section then becomes more complex, listing twelve
considerations the SEC is to have in mind as it conducts the study.
Salient among those considerations are the following:
* "[W]hether retail customers understand that there are different
standards of care applicable to brokers, dealers, [and] investment
advisers;"' 8
* Whether, if they are cognizant of it, that difference is "a source of
confusion for retail customers;"19
* What are the "regulatory, examination, and enforcement
resources" which the Commission, the states, and self-regulatory
securities organizations devote to "enforce the standards of care
for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers," including the
frequency of examinations and the length of examinations;2
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Dodd-Frank, supranote 9, § 913(b)(1).
Id.§ 913(b)(2).
Id. § 913(c)(3).
Id. § 913(c)(4).
Id. § 913(c)(5)(B)-(C).
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* The potential impact on broker-dealers of imposing on them the
standards and requirements applicable to investment advisers;21
and
* Consider "the varying level of services provided by brokers,
dealers, [and] investment advisers ... and the varying scope of
customer relationships . . . ."22
B. The Landscape

Eleven thousand investment advisers are registered with the SEC.2 3
Registered advisers manage more than $38 trillion on behalf of
individual investors, managed funds (including hedge funds), and
institutional investors.24 More than 275,000 individuals are registered as
advisers within state or federally registered firms.25 A further 15,000
investment advisory firms are registered with the states.26 Formerly,
advisers who managed less than $25 million registered with the states
only. As of July 21, 2011, Dodd-Frank raised the threshold to $100
million.27 Presumably then, the number of state-only registrations will
have risen in the last few years.
Registered broker-dealers are more numerous than advisers, although
the number of firms is smaller (5,100 versus 11,000). The Commission
oversees those 5,100 broker-dealers who, in the aggregate, service 110
There are over 600,000 registered
million customer accounts.28
representatives or registered principals (owners), "engaging in a variety
of business activities, which may or may not include the provision of
personalized investment advice or recommendations about securities to
retail customers." 29
C. The Commentary

No need exists to rehash the learned commentary that has debated the
wisdom vel non of the SEC imposing a uniform fiduciary standard upon
broker-dealers. There has been more than a modest amount of it.

21. Id. § 913(c)(9).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. § 913(c)(1 1).
IA/BD STUDY, supra note 11, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Dodd-Frank, supra note 9, §410.
IA/BD STUDY, supra note 11, at 8.
Id.
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One of the earliest and most learned of the commentators, Professor
Don Langevoort of Georgetown University, observes that a fiduciary
mantle seems antithetical to the role expected of registered
representatives, that is, to be a sales person-albeit one whose sales
pitch often is leavened by a dose of supposedly disinterested advice. 30
Professor Arthur Laby of Rutgers University School of Law urges the
holding out implicit, or often explicit, in brokerage firm advertising and
the choice of titles used-"financial adviser"-as 3 roviding a policy
basis for imposing a uniform fiduciary standard.
This Essay, of
course, argues that under precedents already existing in many states'
laws, a holding out is a legal basis for stating that a fiduciary duty
already exists.
A third commentator, James Wrona, is a senior official at FINRA.
By means of a painstaking study of FINRA's rules and their
antecedents, as well as his knowledge of the industry, Mr. Wrona points
out that the existing web of rules and institutional constrains comes very
close to imposing upon most brokers a regime ver similar to the one
which a uniform fiduciary standard might produce.
Professor Barbara Black, Charles Hartsock Professor of Law at the
University of Cincinnati, was among the earliest to write on the topic. 34
In one early piece, she chided the SEC for interpreting the "solely
incidental" exception to application of the Advisers Act as permitting
brokers to charge asset based lump sum fees to customers without
having to register as investment advisers. 35 The Advisers Act contains
exemptions from registration for advisers who service fewer than ten
accounts, or whose provision of advice is solely incidental to provision
of some other service such as legal services (probating a will, offering
suggestions on investment of a personal injury settlement). The SEC
"made a serious mistake in allowing broker-dealers to hold themselves
out as financial advisers or financial consultants" without registration
under and application of the Act.36

30. See Donald Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. Prrr. L. REv. 439, 440 (2010)
("Brokers have always offered advice, but usually in the context of selling products and services, and
selling is not a fiduciary occupation.").
31. Laby, Selling Advice, supranote 14, at 753-68.
32. See notes and accompanying text infra.
33. Wrona, supra note 7, at 17-36.
34. Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers-What's in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
31(2005).
35. These are so-called WRAP, or "all-in" accounts, discussed in notes and accompanying text
infra.
36. Black, supra note 34, at 54 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The CollisionofEthics and Risk in SecuritiesLaw, 64
U. Prrr. L. REV. 483 (2003).
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III. THE UNDERWHELMING IMPACT OF ANY NEW STANDARD
A. Brokers' Compensation

The mind's eye picture of a broker is of an individual recommending
the purchase and on occasion the sale, of common and preferred stocks,
as well as fixed income instruments (bonds), and the subsequent
execution of trades to which the customer has assented. Indeed, that is
what many registered representatives, what colloquially we refer to as
brokers, do. But execution of such trades usually will represent the
lowest level of compensation for which the broker is eligible.
The usual commission of a trade by a full service broker hovers
around 1.5% of the trade amount. Thus on the purchase of, say, 1000
shares of a $20 stock, the "ticket" will include a commission of $300.
How much of that sum the individual broker receives is subject to a
sliding scale. If the broker is a novice, or a low-level producer (say, less
than $100,000 in gross commissions for the year), she may receive only
25% of the total commission, or $75. Moving up the scale, if the broker
is a medium level producer (say, between $100,000 and $500,000
annually), she receives a larger share of the commission, 37.5% of the
total commission, or $112.50 on the $20,000 trade. At the top of the
food chain is the high level producer, who receives half of the total
commission on every ticket she writes. In this case, she would receive
$150."
On other products, though, the commissions are much greater. More
importantly here, perhaps, the low-level and middle-range producers
receive a much greater share of the commission on products other than
listed stocks or bonds. In fact, novice brokers may stand shoulder-toshoulder with the high-end producers on these products; no sliding scale
exists. For example, mutual fund sales used to sell with a 7.5%
commission. With the advent and subsequent ubiquity of no-load funds,
commissions on load fund sales have been reduced, but 4 to 4.5% is still
greater than 1.5% on a stock transaction (which eventually will be
doubled to 3% for a roundtrip, that is, a purchase and a later sale of a
stock, but that may be far into the future; by contrast, there are no
commissions on the subsequent sale of a mutual fund share, which will
be back to the fund itself). So on a $20,000 mutual fund sale the upfront
commission may be as high as $800 rather than $300.38 The individual
37. Brokerage firms regard their compensation arrangements to be proprietary information. The
examples used in the text are not based upon any single firm's compensation schedule. Rather they are
based upon the author's extensive experience working with and in the broker-dealer field.
38. One frequently cited source uses 5% as a benchmark for load funds with a distribution
between
4%
and
8%.
See
No-Load
Fund,
INVESTOPEDIACOM,
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broker will receive half, $400, regardless of whether she is a low-level
or a high-end producer.
Then there is the matter of A shares versus B shares. On A shares
the purchaser pays the commission up front, at the time of purchase. 3
On B shares, the investor pays the commission over time, which seems
preferable to a thrifty investor, at least until he finds out that he will pa
a higher commission overall, a fact not easily ascertained.
Traditionally, a FINRA arbitration has had one industry representative.41
The industry representatives with whom I have sat generally do not take
issue with a broker selling mutual funds rather than stocks. They do,
however, take issue, and do so universally, when a broker has put a
customer into B shares.42
Escalating, we come to the issue of proprietary products, that is,
products devised and packaged internally by the financial services firms
themselves. Limited partnership interests in mining, oil and gas, real
estate, vineyards, Christmas tree farms, airplanes, long-haul trucks,
wheat farms, and so on, come to mind, as do some annuity products.
The commission on proprietary products may be as much as 7%, even as
high as 10%.43 Firms give half, or more, even sometimes 100%, of the
commission to the brokers who sell the products, regardless of their
annual output.44 The firms can afford to do so because they rake in
millions in terms of management fees, indirect overhead expenses, and
other items they charge to the entities they create.45 So for a low or
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/no-loadfund.asp (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
39. "Class A shares typically charge a front-end sales charge.... Class A shares may impose an
asset-based sales charge (often 0.25 per year), but it generally is lower than the charge imposed by other
classes (often 1 percent per year for B and C shares)." FINRA, UnderstandingMutual Fund Classes
(Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.finra.org/investors/protectyourself/investoralerts/mutualfunds/p006022.
40. "Class B shares .. . normally impose a contingent deferred sales charge (CDSC), which you
would pay if you sell your shares within a certain period, often six years," in addition to a charge on the
original sale but paid over time. Id.
41. Effective February 1, 2011, claimants with a dispute involving more than $100,000 may elect
an "all public arbitration panel......
FINRA, Regulatory Notice 11-05 (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Notices/20 1/Pl 22880. Formerly, at least one of the three
arbitrators comprising an arbitration panel had to be an industry representative. Id.
42. Another wrinkle is "shelf space," which may involve greater commissions for brokers who
sell shares of a certain select group of mutual funds which have, in effect, paid "payola" for a financial
services firm to push their funds, or to sell their funds alone. See, e.g., Edward D. Jones & Co.,
Securities Act Release No. 8520, Exchange Act Release No. 50,910, 84 SEC Docket 1798, 2004 WL
3177119 (Dec. 22, 2004) (joint NASD, SED, and NYSE proceeding).
43. See, e.g., KURT EICHENWALD, SERPENT ON THE ROCK 250 (2005) (8% commission at
Prudential Bache). See also id. at 21 (8% for limited partnership participations versus 1% on sale of
stock).
44. See id. at 144, 183 (sales commission plus one half of cash receipts to Prudential Bache if
sales of product exceeded $25,000).
45. See id. at 152 (in investment partnerships more than 20% of investors' dollars went to fees
for Prudential Bache and its affiliates); id. at 247-48 (as general manager of partnerships, brokerage

2013] A CHANGING MOSAIC IN SEC REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT

531

middle level producer, which would include the majority of all
registered representatives, her take will range from $75-$112.50 on a
stock sale, to $400 on a mutual fund transaction, to $700 on sale of an
in-house, or proprietary, product. It is easy to surmise on which side of
the ledger the average broker will overload her time and effort. 46
In my experience, most of the sharp dealing and misrepresentation
occurs when brokers sell nonstock products, such as mutual funds and
proprietary products. Why? Because of the commission structure, and
the significantly greater amounts of compensation selling brokers are in
line to receive, brokers push too hard, making unsuitable or hard sales of
products for which they often have no basis or an inadequate one.47
B. Curbing the Uncurbable in Human Nature
In theory, introduction of a uniform fiduciary standard will mean that,
at all times, brokers will have to keep ascendant the best interests of the
customer rather than the best interests of the broker or of the firm for
whom the broker works. In the old world, "the broker can recommend a
high-load mutual fund to a customer," or some other product, "without
revealing that Vanguard [a low cost, no load fund complex] has a
comparable product in terms of expected market returns that costs
substantially less." 48 In the new world, at least on paper, the broker
subject to an overriding fiduciary duty may not do so. Will anything
really change? Probably not. Given the way in which firms compensate
brokers, a subject over which the SEC has no direct power, adoption of
a fiduciary standard for brokers will not accomplish more than an iota of
what the uninitiated believe.
received "fat fees" and "huge fees"); id. at 285-86 (Prudential Bache received 30% of investors' funds
up-front in Energy Growth Fund). As a rule, the sponsoring broker-dealer served as general partner of
the limited partnership, receiving generous fees in that capacity. See, e.g., id. at 145 (shared general
partner duties with actual promoter); id. at 296 (service as general partner). They rewarded themselves
with other fees as well, often paid through affiliates. See id. at 117 (monitoring fee); id. at 248
(allowances for organization and offering expenses, or O&O fees); id. at 249 (acquisition fee on
acquisition of the assets).
46. Somewhat oddly, I find that the old warhorses, and the high-end producers, have little or no
interest in selling fund shares or proprietary products. Their interest is in their first love, which brought
them into the business in the first place: the analysis and sale of stocks and bonds. Perhaps it is that at
that stage of their careers experienced brokers are writing much larger tickets for higher net worth
individuals and institutions. They make more money doing that than they could selling proprietary
products or loaded funds, products in which their clients are likely to have very little interest.
47. Nonetheless, in spite of all of that, Dodd-Frank "provides that offering only proprietary
products by a broker-dealer shall not, in and of itself, violate the uniform fiduciary standard" (if one is
adopted). IA/BD STUDY, supra note 11, at 113. In all probability, knowing that some of the most
egregious abuses occur on the sale of proprietary products, the brokerage industry sought inclusion of a
very targeted provision in the legislation.
48. Langevoort, supranote 30, at 445.
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C. Broker's Compensation-RoundII
Euphemistically, commentators distinguish between "fee-based"
broker's compensation and "transaction-based" compensation. 49 The
later type compensation is the commission or, in the over-the-counter
market, the markup. In contrast, commentators never seem to spell out
what they mean by the former but, in the trade, the term used is
"WRAP" accounts, rather than "fee-based."
If the retail investor has no interest in mutual funds, or in proprietary
products, or if the broker has no interest in selling them, the broker may
then attempt to sell the customer a WRAP account. Financial services
firms too pressure their "account executives" to sign up customers for
WRAP accounts.
What precisely is a WRAP account?5 0 Taking their inspiration from
hedge fund managers, who amass huge fortunes charging "2 and 20,"
that is, an annual 2% of the amount under management plus 20% of any
profits made under their management, 5 ' brokers urge clients to sign up
for accounts charged only an annual fee based upon the size of the
account, rather than trade-by-trade commissions, as has been traditional.
Typically, WRAP account agreements provide for an annual fee equal to
1.5% of the amount under management, although many firms permit
their brokers to negotiate down from that level to 1% or 80-90 basis
points. Most brokers do so, and rather quickly at that.
The reason brokers do so is that even at a reduced rate the WRAP
account represents a higher compensation level than do trade-by-trade

commissions, usually a much higher level. Take for instance an investor
with a $1 million account. If she has a turnover rate of 25% in the
account, which would be a high level of purchases and sales in an
individual account, she would pay $3,750, or perhaps less, in
commissions. If her broker persuaded her to sign up for a WRAP
account, she would pay $9,000, $10,000, or even as much as $15,000
annually. 52
Brokers and the financial services industry vigorously defend the idea
of WRAP accounts. For one, they say, a WRAP removes from the
49. See, e.g., Black, supra note 34, at 31-32.
50. The SEC study refers to this as an "all-in fee." IA/BD STUDY, supranote 11, at 152.
51. See, e.g., Thomas J. Brennan & Karl S. Okamoto, Measuring the Tax Subsidy in Private
Equity and Hedge Fund Compensation, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 27 (2008) (2 and 20 compensation for hedge
fund managers reviewed).
52. Typical WRAP fees are 1.5% on equity holdings and .35% on bond holdings, according to
one source. Asher Hawkins, WRAP Account Ripoff FORBES.COM (Mar. 25, 2010, 1:40 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0412/investing-brokerage-commission-retirement-fmra-rippingyou-off.html. According to another source, WRAP fees may be even higher. See JOHN C. BOGLE &
DAVID SWENSEN, COMMON SENSE ON MUTuAL FUNDS 54 (10th Anniversary ed. 2010) (as high as 3%
annually).
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broker the conflict of interest which results when she is compensated
only if a transaction ensues.5
That is hogwash. Individuals go to a full-service rather than discount
broker such as Charles Schwab or E*Trade for a reason. The reason is
that they expect a full service broker to provide them with a variety of
advice and observation, such as "That's a stupid idea," which my broker
has told me on more than occasion. "You realize that by making this
trade you'll have more than 5% in railroad stocks," or "keep your
powder dry because there may be better buying opportunities in the
future," or "it's okay to buy some but I would just nibble here," or "our
prediction is that this stock (or industry, or the market as a whole) will
only move sideways for the next (6 months? Year?)" are examples of
advice full service brokers give to their clients. You get what you pay
for and what you pay for in a full-service broker is advice like that, not
bare-bones executions. WRAP accounts seem like a bad deal, an
escalation above the full commission level, making the investor pay
extra for the receipt of what he already should be receiving for standard
commissions. To an experienced investor WRAP accounts are simply
beyond the pale. 54
D. Curbing the Uncurbablein Human Nature-Round II

Will the adoption of an across-the-board fiduciary standard curb
brokers from hard sell of WRAP accounts, at least to their less
sophisticated customers? As my Australian and English friends would
say, "Not bloody likely!" The stakes and the temptations are simply too
great. A broker who signs up a score of million dollar plus portfolios to
53. "In many cases the best advice [a broker] can give .. . is to 'do nothing."' Report of the
Committee on Compensation Practices, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85, 614, at
86,508 (Apr. 10, 1995). "Accordingly, fee-based accounts better align the customers' and the brokers'
interests, because brokers are not financially motivated to give advice to generate a sales commission."
Black, supra note 34, at 32 (footnote omitted).
54. The brokerage industry won this one, at least from a regulatory viewpoint. Under the long
prevailing interpretation of the Investment Advisers Act (IAA), a broker was excluded from the IAA's
definition of investment adviser only if both (1) his performance of advisory services was "solely
incidental" to the conduct of his business as a broker-dealer; and (2) he received "no special
compensation" for his services. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l l)(C) (2012). In 1999, when brokerage firms
had begun in large measure to sell WRAP accounts, a rule change was necessary so that brokers
receiving WRAP fees did not become investment advisers because of the receipt of special
compensation. So, after intense lobbying by the financial services industry, in 2005 the SEC changed
the rule to accommodate the marketing of fee-based accounts. It adopted rule 202(a)(l l)-1, eliminating
the no special compensation aspect of the definition. 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(l l)-1 (reserved by Rules
Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950 (July 19,
2011)). See also Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 (Apr. 19, 2005). Professor Barbara Black has termed this
change a "mistake" and a "serious mistake." Black, supra note 34, at 54, 56.
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WRAP accounts has placed a comfortable floor, or cushion, underneath
pursuance of her livelihood. Adoption of a new standard, not enforced,
will not stop that.
E. The Myriad Conflicts ofInterest in the Modern FinancialFirm

Brokers used to sell stocks and bonds. In today's firms, in addition to
stocks, brokers can sell WRAP account services, money-market
checking accounts, banking services of all types including home
mortgages, mutual funds, annuities, accident and life insurance, and so
on.5 5 Moreover, brokers have strong incentives to move customers into
areas in which the broker's compensation will be greater and residuals
may ensure compensation in future years as well, as in the sale of B
mutual fund shares or life insurance policies. 5 6
That said and done, many brokers, particularly experienced ones,
have little or no interest in selling anything other than their first love,
stocks and bonds. Nonetheless, their superiors may attempt to force
them to do so.5 7 Heedless of the myriad of conflicts involved, the
financial services industry, and most of the firms within it, have been
enamored of the "one stop financial shopping" for over thirty years
now. CEO Brian Moynihan of Bank of America sees "cross-selling"
55. See, e.g., IA/BD STUDY, supra note 11, at 94 n.447 ("Years ago, I was pretty sure who I was
dealing with ....
Today, it's a totally different story. All kinds of products such as securities,
insurance, fee based products, bank accounts, loans, health insurance, auto/homeowners insurance, etc.
are sold by people calling themselves: financial advisers; financial consultants; investment advisers;
investment consultants; financial planners; asset managers; financial services advisors; [and] registered
representatives ....
It has come to the point that I really don't know who I'm dealing with . . . ."
(quoting Letter from Bert Oshiro (Aug. 29, 2010))). It is highly unlikely that imposition of a fiduciary
standard will lessen the confusion.
56. Life insurance agents typically receive commissions of 6% per year of the premium paid on
whole-life life insurance and 4% per year on term life insurance, plus a bonus for initiating a new policy.
Bobbie Sage, How Much Money Does My Agent Make from My Life Insurance Purchases?,
ABOUT.COM, http://www.personalinsurance.about.com/od/life/f/lifefac3.htm (last visited Dec. 31,
2013). Increasing the attraction for the selling agent, insurance premia typically are front-end loaded,
with the selling agent receiving up to 70%, or even 85%, of the premia the insured pays in the first year,
with correspondingly disproportionately smaller commissions on the policy's back end, which usually
ends with the policy's tenth year. Thereafter the selling agent continues to receive a fee but only a small
one, known as a "persistency fee." See Jay MacDonald, How Much Does a Life Insurance Agent
Make?, BANKRATE.COM (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/insurance/life-insuranceagent-make-I .aspx (estimates commissions on life insurance at 7.5% overall and front-end loading up to
85%); Faizah Imani, What Kind of Commissions Do Insurance Agents Get?, ZiPRECRUITER.COM,
http://career.ziprecruiter.com/kind-commissions-insurance-agents-get-1406.htnl (last visited Dec. 31,
2013) (front end loading up to 70%).
57. And the SEC may aid and abet brokerage firms that want to move into the insurance area.
See, e.g., InsuranceAgencies Gain No-Action ReliefFor Plans to Network with Brokerage Firms, SEC.
L. DAILY, Apr. 26, 2013 (SEC ruling green lights joint efforts to sell "variable annuity contracts,
variable life insurance policies, and other life insurance policies and annuity contracts" to investors).
58. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 15, at 887 (industry emphasis on "one stop financial shopping"
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as the solution to the near insoluble problems brought on by Bank of
America's acquisition of Countrywide Mortgage and Merrill Lynch.s9
Sandy Weill blended brokerage, banking, insurance, and other financial
firms into Citigroup because of the opportunities for "cross-selling"
such a combination represented. 60
One stop financial shopping has not made nearly the inroads with
consumers which gurus of the financial world predicted. It seems that
while agreeing with the notion of a level playing field, consumers still
want that field divided into several paddocks. Consumers want
investments handled through a brokerage firm; their insurance needs
handled by an insurance agent; and their commercial banking down the
block from the local bank.
Nonetheless, the financial services industry continues its headlong
pursuit of the cross-selling notion. Some persons who come through a
firm's front door wanting an investment in a blue chip stock or two will
wind up with an annuity or a life insurance policy. Will adoption of a
fiduciary standard applicable to broker-dealers change any of that?
Somewhat but not appreciably.61
F. The Low PriorityGiven Compliance in the Industry

If the SEC promulgates a new, uniform fiduciary standard, the task of
implementing and enforcing it will in the first instance fall upon
compliance officers at brokerage firms. The effort therefore will be a
weak one-throughout the industry firms give only lip service to
compliance. Nothing in any new or proposed rule will change this fact.
My experiences are only anecdotal but extensive. Overall, brokerdealer firms give the compliance function to a relatively junior person.
That junior person has the last office, at the end of the corridor, on the
executive floor, or, indeed, on the floor below. Senior executives do not
hear from, and do not expect to hear from, the compliance officer. The
usual result is that to be heard at the top, the compliance officer "must
shoot to kill." If she does that, executives and managers in the firm will
sit up and listen but one consequence may be that the compliance office

in 1980).
59. See Shayndi Raice & Corrie Driebusch, Bull Sees Red Over B ofA Cross-Sales, WALL ST. J.,
May 21, 2013, at Cl ("Chief Executive Brian Moynihan's strategy [is] to squeeze more revenue and
profit from 'cross-selling' everything from stocks to mutual funds to credit cards to mortgages.").
60. SANDY WEILL & JUDAH S. KRAUSHAAR, THE REAL DEAL: MY LIFE IN BUSINESS AND
PHILANTHROPY 371 (2006) (Citigroup efforts at joint venture with AOL to extend cross-selling to "an
online financial supermarket"); id. at 389 (Citigroup cross-selling of brokerage services, annuities and
life insurance, bank credit cards, and home mortgages).
61. Discussed notes and text accompanying infra.
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loses her job as well.62
I was a consultant to one of my former students who was one of two
in-house attorneys at a sizeable regional broker-dealer firm in Seattle.
He had to juggle compliance duties with the myriad other legal matters
which he and his cohort were expected to deal, including the extensive
underwriting of limited partnerships (tax shelters) sold in numerous
private placements and most of which blew up soon after sale, much like
IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices).
Another compliance officer at another firm assumed the compliance
role first, attending law school later, where I taught him in evening
school and later became a consultant to him and his firm. His firm was
another large, Los Angeles based regional firm which since that time has
become a national firm. He was the only compliance officer, for the
entire firm, which even at that time had offices on both coasts.
In arbitration cases, financial firms often have a compliance officer
testify, to the effect that as a controlling person, the firm "had no
knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the
facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person [the
registered rep] is alleged to exist."63 In other cases, the branch manager
will proffer the testimony. Sometimes both individuals, compliance
officer and branch manager, will testify.
When the witness is a compliance officer, invariably he or she is a
very junior person. Good evidence would be that the firm had a written
plan of supervision, written or at least extensively reviewed and revised
at headquarters, and that the plan was in fact implemented. But the
evidence offered almost always falls far short of the mark. One reason
is that the compliance officer comes from corporate headquarters and
may have never met the respondent registered rep until the morning the
arbitration commences. 64
One of the more recent case in which I was involved was a state court
proceeding in Louisiana involving an institutional investor who had
invested $62 million in a proprietary product of a regional financial
62. But see In First-of-Its-KindSEC Suit, Ex-Exec Settles Allegations of Misleading CCO Over
Trades, SEC. L. DAILY, Aug. 28, 2013 (portfolio manager who misled compliance officer paid $350,000
in settlement).
63. Securities Act of 1933 § 15(a). The controlling person provision of the Securities Exchange
Act is slightly different. The controlling person must prove that they "acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action." Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012).
64. In cases against a particular firm, characterized by one and two person offices in smaller
cities and towns, all supervision and compliance emanates from the home office in St. Louis. My
estimate is that under such a supervision-from-afar setup, rogue brokers are brought to heel, and
schemes nipped in the bud, only 90 or 120 days later than would have been the case at a more traditional
shop, with 15 or 20 brokers under the watchful eye of a branch manager. My fellow arbitrators did not
agree with me, or agree wholeheartedly.
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firm. When the product, and its manager (a rogue in the extreme),
began a precipitous downward slide, the compliance officer, a relatively
junior person, drafted a bulletin for branch offices and "FAs." The
bulletin asked FAs and wealth managers to review all accounts holding
the product, warning that the product no longer was suitable for
discretionary or trust accounts or any other accounts over which firm
employees had management responsibilities. The CEO of the entire
organization intervened to quash release of the bulletin. He vetoed it
instantaneously.
That the CEO did so is not surprising. Financial firms are about
selling. Compliance and the details attendant to it are at most a
necessary evil. "[S]tories from the financial crisis frequently tell of
lower end institutions-small city or township pension funds, for
example-who were easy prey for salespeople from securities firms
peddling exotic debt instruments . . . ."65 We will never have complete
knowledge but probably compliance officers did not, and could not, stop
those sales efforts. "[P]ushin 6excessively costly investment strategies
is profitable for the industry," often extremely so. Firm mangers are
not likely to permit compliance officers to intervene in any but the most
egregious cases. "The broker may spend time helping the customer with
general asset allocation advice [or] basic financial education . ... Of

course, some (perhaps a lot) of the time there is little or no added value:
the broker is simply pushing an inferior product on unsophisticated
investors . . . ."67 The CEO may not approve of that but he does not
want the compliance officer getting in the way of it.
The weak link that compliance officers and departments represent is a
major factor in why any standard the SEC adopts will have much less
force and effect than one might predict.6 8
G. Opacityof the DisputeResolution Process
Traditionally the United States is a common law jurisdiction which
operates by the common law method. General principles issue forth,
either mouthed by authoritative courts or contained in legislation.
65. Langevoort, supra note 30, at 452.
66. Id. at 445.
67. Id. at 448.
68. The Commission staff has expressed a great deal of faith in brokerage firm compliance
officers, a significant amount more than the author would. See, e.g., IA/BD STUDY, supranote 11, at 76
("FINRA Rules [Rule 3130(a)] require broker-dealers to designate one or more principals to serve as
CCO. At least annually, the CCO must meet with the broker-dealer's chief executive officer ("CEO") to
discuss the compliance program, and the CEO must certify that, among other things, the firm has in
place processes to establish, maintain, review, modify and test policies and procedures reasonably
designed to achieve compliance .... ).
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Through case-by-case adjudication, courts apply those general principles
to actual disputes, adumbrating subprinciples or providing a factual and
legal framework from which further broader principles may be deduced.
Judges write and publish opinions, available in law libraries or on the
Internet, making those opinions, general principles, and more discrete
applications available to all.
The content of those opinions enable legal practitioners and citizens
to "bargain in the shadow of the law," as a famous law review article
discussed. 69 Either alone or in conjunction with our attorneycounselors, we also shape our conduct in the shadow of the law.
In this area, broker-dealer law, since 1987, we have had no law, or
little law, in whose shadow we can bargain, or shape conduct. The
reason is the Supreme Court's reversal of its 1953 decision Wilko v.
Swan.70 Wilko held that an agreement to arbitrate a securities law
broker--customer dispute constituted an illicit waiver of the securities
statutes' protection which provisions of the Act expressly render void.7 '
Twin decisions in 1987 reversed Wilko v. Swan, holding that rather than
a waiver of statutory protections an agreement to arbitrate constitutes
merely a selection of the forum in which questions will be decided.7 2
Since that time, all customer agreements at brokerage firms contain an
arbitration clause. All, or most all, customer dispute go to FINRA
arbitration proceedings rather than to court.
Judges write opinions. Arbitrators seldom do, in part because the pay
arbitrators receive is miniscule. So aside from an outlier or two, such as
when a dispute against a bank or a small, less sophisticated broker
makes it to court, the stage has gone dark. Broker-dealer disputes
disappear into the arbitration black hole. In an earlier arbitration case in
judgment of which I sat, my fellow arbitrators were incredulous when I
opined that I might write an opinion.
Ordinarily, then, when the SEC, another agency, or a court enunciates
a new general standard, such as a uniform fiduciary standard, further
decisions will adumbrate subprinciples, case holdings, and valuable
dicta. That process will not unfold here because arbitration has come to
rule the roost and one of its salient characterizations ranges from
"opaque" to "completely dark."
Over time, though, the SEC and FINRA staffs could deduce and

69. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
70. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
71. Securities Act of 1933 § 14 (Contrary Stipulations Void); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 29(a) (Validity of Contracts).
72. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (expressly overruling Wilko v. Swan).
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evolve more discrete rules from the general principle, that is, the
uniform fiduciary standard. I have very little confidence in an SEC staff
which shows itself largely unaware that most broker-dealer customer
disputes go to arbitration rather than to court. Blissfully unaware, the
SEC staff seems to believe that case-by-case court adjudications have
continued and in the future will flesh out what the general standard
requires in various sets of circumstances. 73 Staff members further
believe, apparently, that the determination of a fiduciary relationship's
existence is a matter of federal law. The delve not one iota into the
state law which would govern such issues.
A famous juridical statement concerns fiduciary status: "But to say
that a man is a fiduciary only begins the analysis; it gives direction to
further inquiry." 75 SEC staff authoring the Investment Adviser/Broker
Dealer Study attribute the remark to Justice Benjamin Cardozo. 76 The
difficulty is that, as every lawyer should know, Justice Felix Frankfurter
penned the statement when Justice Cardozo had been dead for five
years.77 Though trivial, such gaffes do not inspire confidence in the
SEC staff's ability to take the laboring oar on the adumbration of
subprinciples and rules for broker-dealers.
IV. BROKERS ALREADY MAY BE AND FREQUENTLY ARE FIDUCIARIES
A. Introduction

Thus the adoption of a fiduciary standard will not add much to the
equation. Any new standard may add even less when one considers that
many more broker-dealers have taken on the mantle of fiduciary, either
voluntarily or inadvertently, or so it may be argued, than commentators
previously have recognized. This may be discerned in part by a simple
review of the labels brokers and firm place upon the position. In the
'50s and '60s many brokers called themselves "customers' men" (there
were few women brokers then).

78

In the '70s and '80s, brokers called

73. See, e.g., IA/BD STUDY, supra note 11, at 46-87 (Commission and Self-Regulatory
Regulation of Broker-Dealers). The staff discussion fails to cite a single arbitration decision or to note
that most of the cases which its study cites are relatively old, that is, of 1990 or older vintage.
74. See notes and accompanying text infra.
75. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
76. IA/BD STUDY, supra note 11, at 110.
77. Justice Cardozo died in 1938. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, WIKIPEDIA.ORG,
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin N_Cardozo (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
78. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, THE LAST MALE BASTION: GENDER AND THE CEO SUITE
IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC COMPANIES 43 (2010) (Marion Sandler, later to become CEO of Golden West
Financial, in the 1950s said that as a woman she could never be made at partner at Dominick &
Dominick, a leading Wall Street firm where she had spent 5 years as an analyst.).
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themselves "account executives." 79 Today the vogue is, officially and
unofficially, to call firm representatives who deal with the public
"financial advisers," or "FAs" for short.80 The choice of label is, (1)
ubiquitous within the industry; (2) not inadvertent; and, (3) highly
conducive to finding that today many brokers already are fiduciaries, at
least in the eyes of the law. 8 '
One aside: the SEC staffs study of this issue is woefully insufficient.
Absent a statute preempting state law, the creation of a fiduciary
relationship is a subject for state, and not federal, law. That said and
done, many federal decisions, including most of the later opinions
blithely gloss over this issue, citing and analyzing federal cases only.83
The better decisions, however, recognize and analyze the creation of a
fiduciary relations vel non to be an issue of state law.83 Yet in
discussing this subject, the SEC's Study on Investment Advisers and
Broker-Dealersneither cites nor inquiries into state law, at all. 84
B. Holding Out by Broker-DealersMake Them Fiduciaries
Professor Arthur Laby makes a case that reasonable expectations
created both by brokerage firm advertising and by brokers' own actions
A strong
should justify a fiduciary obligation for broker-dealers.
argument can be made that such activities already do result in duties of
the utmost care, loyalty, and good faith.
First, the "should" part, which borrows heavily from Professor Laby's
treatment. Merrill Lynch was among the first of the brokerage firms to
79. See, e.g., Advertisement by Reynolds Securities, Inc., FORBES, Jan. 15, 1973, at 35;
Advertisement by Merrill Lynch, FORBES, July 1, 1966, at 41.
80. See, e.g., Advertisement by Prudential Securities, Inc., FORBES, Apr. 20, 1998, at 75.
Financial Adviser is the most widely used title in the industry today; see also ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL.,
INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 91 (2008),

available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf.
81. Claimants recognize this. Of 7,137 arbitrations filed with FINRA in 2009, 4,206 alleged that
the respondent was a fiduciary who had breached fiduciary duties. IA/BD STUDY, supra note 11, at 81,
81 n.384. Misrepresentation (3,408), negligence (3,405), breach of contract (2,802), failure to supervise
(2,691), and unsuitability (2,473) were the next most popular claims. Id.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a fiduciary
duty is "[m]ost commonly" found when "a broker has discretionary authority over a customer's
account"); United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 211 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Although it is true that there 'is no
general fiduciary duty inherent in an ordinary broker/customer relationship,"' a relationship of trust and
confidence may arise where there has been an entrustment by the customer.).
83. See, e.g., Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, 3 F.3d 208, 212 (7th Cir. 1993) ("A brokerdealer in Wisconsin is not a fiduciary with respect to accounts over which the customer has the final say,
and in the absence of unusual circumstances owes the customer only a duty of ordinary care.");
Midamerica Fed. Savings & Loan v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886 F.2d 1249, 1257 (10th Cir. 1989)
(existence of a fiduciary relationship is a matter of Oklahoma state law).
84. See IA/BD STUDY, supra note 11, at 52-84.
85. Laby, Selling Advice, supra note 14, at 753-74.
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advertise, beginning in the 1940s. 8 The New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) encouraged ersatz investors with its "Own Your Share of
American Business" from 1954 to 1968.87 The NYSE encouraged
investors to sign up with a broker for the Monthly Investment Plan
(MIP), emphasizing "shirt sleeve capitalism."8 8 One financial services
firm advertised "service to every investor, including the little guy";
another promised "investment insight" tailored to "the individual needs"
of the client. 89
The advertisements the industry published were replete with comeons and holdings-out. One firm promised "[t]otal [flinancial [p]lanning
[which] requires a careful assessment of your entire financial
situation." 90 "Talk to your financial consultant for straight answers"
exhorted another.91 A third had the mantra in its advertising that "If you
want to know What's Going On On Wall Street, Ask Shearson
Hammill." 92
One argument for imposition of a fiduciary duty comes from agency
law. If a third party reasonably believes an agent (the financial advisor)
has authority to act, and that belief is traceable to the manifestations of
the principal (the financial services firm), the agent will be deemed to
have apparent authority. 93
The numerous television and print
advertisements of modem financial services firms create in would-be
investors and clients the reasonable apprehension that the registered
representative is a fiduciary and acts at all times in the best interests of
the client, and many times has confidential or inside information.
The representations which individual brokers make mirror what the
firms' advertisements state. Just use of the title "financial adviser"
constitutes a holding out which should provide strong evidence that
reliance is hoped for, and that a fiduciary relationship has come into
being.
The use of advertising and of labels and titles "laden with the
language of advice" providers surely supports imposition of a fiduciary
duty. However, the advertisements and labels support the contention
that a fiduciary relationship already exists in a great many cases.
86. Id. at 754.
87. Id.
88. Branson, supranote 15, at 860.
89. Laby, Selling Advice, supra note 14, at 755 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
90. Id. at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id.
92. Stephen Miller, Alger Chapman: Street Veteran Who Sold Shearson Hammill, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 20, 2013, at C2 (Obituary).
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENcY § 2.03 (2006); Laby, Selling Advice, supra note 14, at
758-59.
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Courts are quite firm in stating that creation of a franchisorfranchisee relationship does not result in the franchisor becoming a
fiduciary. 94 Courts state unequivocally that, without more, a franchisee
is an independent contractor only, to whom no overriding duties of care,
loyalty, and good faith are owed.95
Typically, the "more" is a holding out by the franchisor that it will
assume responsibility for the overall financial and business health of the
franchisee. "[Franchisor] Sabaro's representatives convinced their
franchisees there was nothing to worry about, Sabaro would handle
all." 96 A fiduciary relationship exists if there exists "an understanding,
held by both parties to the subject agreement, that a special trust and
confidence has been reposed . . . ."97 In the words of a federal district

judge, "[a] fiduciary relationship permits an individual to relax his or her
guard and trust another to care for their interests." 98 "Superior
knowledge and assumption of the role of advisor and friendship are two
factors that may contribute to establishment of a fiduciary
relationship."9 9
Scenarios that fit those facts like a glove unfold in every brokerage
firm and office in the country every business day. Most broker-dealers
are fiduciaries already, as much as they may deny it.
C. Entrustment
A broker-dealer may become a fiduciary by a holding out.
Frequently, the holding out on the broker's side of the table induces a
placement of trust and confidence by the customer seated on the
opposite side of the table. The two, a holding out and an entrustment,
frequently go hand-in-hand.
Nonetheless, courts in some states
94. "The general rule is that there is no fiduciary relationship between a franchisee and a
franchisor." Legend Autorama, LTD. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 954 N.Y.S.2d 141, 144 (N.Y. App. Div.
2012). See also Flegles, Inc. v. TrueServ Corp., 289 S.W.3d 544, 552 (Ky. 2009) (the principle is
"almost universally held"); RHC, LLC v. Quizno's Franchising, LLC, No. 04CV985, 2005 WL
1799536, at *8 (Colo. App. July 19, 2005).
95. See, e.g., Allen v. Hub Cap Heaven, Inc., 484 S.E.2d 259 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
96. In re Sabaro Holding Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 911, 914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (finding fiduciary
relationship). See also Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 740 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Mt. 1986) ("[T]he general
rule [is] that under a franchise agreement a fiduciary relationship does not ordinarily develop. However,
[the plaintiff franchisees] argue that special trust and confidence was reposed by [plaintiffs] in the
expertise of the [defendant franchisor] and that ... a fiduciary duty resulted. When a fiduciary duty
exists the one in the stronger position owes an obligation, by virtue of that trust relationship, to act in the
best interests of the beneficiary.").
97. Saydell v. Geppetto's Pizza & Ribs Franchise Sys. Inc., 652 N.E.2d 218, 231 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996).
98. McGowan v. Pillsbury Co., 723 F. Supp. 530, 536 (W.D. Wa. 1989).
99. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding that no fiduciary relationship existed in the
case at bar).
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emphasize the latter.
In Butcher v. Newberger,100 the investor received 100 shares of a
utility stock in 1930. He never closely inspected it. Two years later the
investor discovered that the certificate was for common shares rather
than for the preferred shares which he had ordered and paid for, and
which had twice the value of the common. The court upheld rejection of
any notion that the plaintiff was barred by laches or by contributory
negligence. Finding brokers' relation to their customers to be "in the
nature of trust," the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expounded on
application of that principle:
Where, as here, the parties dealt on a basis of trust and confidence, the
rule is to hold the party making a representation bound by it.... [I]t is
said that, if fiduciary relations obtain, nothin short of actual knowledge
will prevent recovery of misrepresentations.
Illinois appears to be another entrustment state. In Fischerv. Slayton
& Co.,102 a broker dealer had sold the plaintiff out of common stock,
putting the funds in an in-house managed product which, inter alia,
charged whopping 9% commissions. Referring to the broker as a
"trustee," the appellate judge generalized: "[A] fiduciary relation is not
limited to cases of trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward,
attorney and client, or other recognized legal relations, but it exists in all
cases where confidence is reposed on one side and a resulting
"103
superiority and influence on the other side arises
D. Fiduciaryin All Customer Dealings

A surprising number of states fall into this category.

Seemingly,

Ohio falls into this group. Silverberg v. Thompson McKinnon Securities

Inc.104 involves the all-too-frequent fact pattern in which a registered
representative switches an investor from stocks and bonds into options
trading. The court makes a flat and unequivocal statement on the status
of broker-dealers in Ohio:
A broker-deal is a fiduciary who owes his customer a high degree of care
in transacting his business. A fiduciary must disclose all material
information which he learns concerning the subject matter of the
fiduciary relationship. Good intent is not a defense to a breach of this

100. Butcher v. Newburger, 179 A. 240 (Pa. 1935).
101. Id. at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Fischer v. Slayton & Co., Inc., 134 N.E.2d 673 (111.App. Ct. 1956).
103. Id. at 676.
104. Silverberg v. Thomson, McKinnon Sec., Inc., No. 48545, 1985 WL 6611 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 14, 1985).
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duty. 05
Other Ohio cases contain similar flat, unequivocal statements. "A
broker and client are in a fiduciary relationship and, therefore, the
broker owes the client a duty to disclose material information
concerning investments.',106 Another Ohio appellate court concluded:
"[T]here is general agreement that a broker or financial advisor is in a
fiduciary relationship with his clients." 0 7
Florida seems to be in this camp as well. A bank kept confidential
adverse information the bank possessed about the Atlantic Peru Equity
Fund into which it had put the plaintiff investor. The investor lost
$300,000 when the negative information came to light. "In general, a
stockbroker must deal with its clients in good faith and owes them a
fiduciary duty of loyalty and care," the court flatly concluded. 0 8
E. FiduciaryDuty in All Customer Dealings-California
Since at least 1962, California courts have held broker-dealers
across-the-board fiduciaries, similar to the nationwide rule for which
many contend. The leading case is Twomey v. Mitchun, Jones &
Templeton.109 There the financial adviser told a widow to sell
everything, give him the proceeds, and let him invest the funds. The
stockbroker telephoned her daily.
The firm duly sent to her
confirmation slips, which she professed not completely to understand.
She lost a great deal of money and sued for breach of fiduciary duty.
The defendant argued that across the board fiduciary duty obtained
only in the case of discretionary accounts, which plaintiffs was not.
The court rejected any such notion. The court then began as though it
intended to put California in the entrustment camp, as outlined above:
Confidential and fiduciary relations are, in law, synonymous, and may be
said to exist whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in
the integrity of another.... An agent is a fiduciary. His [or her]
obligation of diligent and faithful service is the same as that imposed
upon a trustee.110
105. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).

106. Byrley v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 640 N.E.2d 187, 198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
107. Mathias v. Rosser, Nos. OlAP-768, 01AP-770, 2002 WL 1066937 (Ohio Ct. App. May 30,
2002). But see Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Soc'y Nat'l Bank, 662 N.E.2d 1074, 1081 (Ohio 1996) ("[A]
fiduciary relationship has been defined by this court as a relationship in which special confidence and
trust is reposed in the integrity and fidelity of another and there is a resulting position of superiority or
influence, acquired by virtue of this special trust." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
108. Ward v. Atl. Sec. Bank, 777 So.2d 1144, 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). AccordGochnauer
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1049 (11th Cir. 1987).
109. Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (Cal Ct. App. 1968).
110. Id. at 235-36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Switching horses in midstream so to speak, though, the California
court transitioned from an entrustment approach to announcement of a
unequivocal and universal principle:
The relationship between broker and principal is fiduciary in nature and
imposes on the broker the duty of acting in the highest good faith toward
the principal.

...

The duties of the broker, being fiducia 7 in character,

must be exercised with the utmost good faith and integrity.
The cases are not plentiful because since 1987 most broker--customer
disputes, in California as well as elsewhere, have gone to arbitration
rather than to court. Nonetheless, the few judicial opinions which see
the light of day invariably follow the Twomey analysis, denominating
the principle as "well-settled."ll 2
F. The Antipode-No FiduciaryDuty

The opposite end of the spectrum is found on the opposite coast,
specifically, in New York. In their typically terse opinions, New York
appellate courts state a flat, unequivocal principle, namely that, "[a]
broker does not, in the ordinary course of business, owe a fiduciary duty
to a purchaser of securities." 1
But the New York cases do not present quite as united a front as the
California cases do. Saboundjian v. Bank Audill 4 revolved around an
experienced currency trader's allegation of breach of fiduciary duty. In
finding a duty and then a breach of that duty, the court seemed to accept
that a broker may become a fiduciary, based upon the entrustment
principle: "The relationship between a customer and his stockbroker is
that of principal and agent; the duty owed by the stockbroker is that of a
fiduciary.""
But Saboubdjain involved a muffled execution rather than the
rendition of investment advice or another more substantive act. In the
case of an execution, all courts, including those in New York, hold that a
broker is an agent. As such, she owes fiduciary duties but those duties
are limited to the scope of the agency, which tends to be quite narrow.
111. Id. at 236 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. See, e.g., Duffy v. Cavalier, 264 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). See also San
Francisco Residence Club, Inc. v. Amado, 773 F. Supp. 822, 834 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that
although historically defendants had acted as brokers the broker-customer relationship had not carried
over to the period of the acts complained of); Brown v. Cal. Pension Adm'rs & Consultants, Inc., 52
Cal. Rptr. 2d 788, 796-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (principle did not apply to bank which only executed
customers' orders).
113. Perl v. Smith Barney Inc., 646 N.Y.S.2d 678, 680 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). Accord Fekety v.
Gruntal & Co., Inc., 595 N.Y.S.2d 190 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
114. Saboundjian v. Bank Audi, 556 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
115. Id.at260-61.
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"Once an order for the sale [or purchase] of securities is accepted, a
broker has a duty to execute it in accordance with the instructions given
and is liable for the resultant loss if it fails to do so."1 16 All courts agree
with this limited application of fiduciary status to a broker. Some
specifically adumbrate the nature of the duties fiduciary status brings
with it in the execution of customers' orders.117
The New York cases negative statement may not only be flimsy, as
some New York courts toy with notions of entrustment and holding out,
but illusory nearly across the board. Gilman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc.118 was filed as a purported class action seeking
damages, or use of money foregone, occasioned by Merrill's practice of
paying East Coast customers with checks drawn on a West Coast bank,
and vice versa. Merrill thus enjoyed an extra day or two of interest on
the "float," the period when the check was in transit back across the
country. The court held that, indeed, a broker could become a fiduciary
when it possessed customer's funds or other property.
"[T]he
relationship between a stockbroker and his customer is one of principal
and agent. The broker, once he has received his customer's funds, is a
fiduciary with respect to those fund[s] . . . ."l19
The New York court, though, saw the potential hole opening up in the
traditional New York analysis. The court stuck its finger in the dike,
limiting its holding to the handling of customer funds: "The obligation
which a stockbroker owes to its customer with regard to advice and
counsel in respect to investments is here immaterial. What is material is
the broker's possession of the funds belonging to the customer."1 20
G. Does Any ofIt Matter?-ImplicationofFiduciary-like Contract
Terms Under the Implied Covenant of Good Faithand FairDealing
Under the Alternative Entities Acts in Delaware, in organic
documents, planners may limit, or eliminate altogether, fiduciary duties,
provided that the entity is not a corporation. Thus, planners and
promoters can and do limit fiduciary principles and their application in
limited liability companies (LLCs), limited partnerships (LPs), limited
liability partnerships (LLPs), and so on. What some of those planners
did not contemplate, though, is that plaintiffs would contend for the
116. Id. at 260.
117. See, e.g., Ward v. AtI. Sec. Bank, 777 So.2d 1144, 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ("the duty
to perform the customer's orders promptly in a manner best suited to serve the customer's interests" and
"the duty to transact business only after receiving approval from the customer" (emphasis omitted)).
118. Gilman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 404 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978).
119. Id. at 262 (citations omitted).
120. Id.
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same sorts of duties and responsibilities on managers' parts. They
would do using the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
which exists in Delaware as well as a number of other jurisdictions.1 21
V. RESULTS A NEW STANDARD MIGHT PRODUCE
A. Beyond Suitability

A broker need only recommend stocks suitable for the customer,
given her age, financial resources, and investment objectives. As has
been observed, faced with a choice between a no-load and a loaded
fund, roughly equivalent to one another in all other material respects, a
broker does not violate prevailing suitability standards by
recommending the fund which brings him the greater commissions.12 2
By contrast, a fiduciary, including a broker who is a fiduciary, must at
all times serve the best interests of the customer. He cannot favor his
own interests or those of family, friends, business associates, or other
businesses in which he may have an interest, over those of the customer.
By choosing the fund with higher commissions, and thus feathering his
own nest at the customer's expense, the broker will have violated his
duty.
Adoption of a uniform fiduciary standard will fill in some gaps and
raise the standard of conduct expected of brokers, but not by as much as
might be hoped. A majority of the cases claimants bring against brokers
already posit the existence of a fiduciary relationship and further allege
violations of the fiduciary duties flowing from that connection. 12 3
B. Reverse Suitability

Most, if not all, invocations of the suitability mantra involve broker
recommendations, urgings, and the like of riskier or more speculative
stocks and other products. Thus, a broker urges a client to sell Dow
Jones Industrial Average stocks to generate cash which the broker urges
should then be used for options trading or, worse yet, trading in naked
options.124 Another example might be the broker who advises and
121. See, e.g., Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, C.A. No. 3658-VCS,
2009 WL 1124451 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009).
122. Langevoort, supra note 30, at 445.
123. See notes and accompanying text supra.
124. A naked option is "[a] trading position where the seller of the option does not own any, or
enough, of the underlying security to act as protection against adverse price movements." Naked
Option, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://investopedia.com/terms/n/naked option.asp (visited Dec. 31, 2013).
"If the price of the underlying security moves against the trader ... [the seller of a call] would be
required to purchase the shares regardless of how high the price is. The potential for losses, then, can be
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facilitates a sale of bank and utility shares in favor of investment in biotech stocks.
Beginning in the '70s, and accelerating in this era of cross-selling and
"'one stop financial shopping," brokers have also available to them a
variety of more conservative products into which they can put their
customers. Moreover, brokers may well be tempted to do so because the
commissions on those products, such as life insurance, annuities or real
estate limited partnerships, will be significantly greater, say, 6 or 7%
versus a 1.5% or so.
Most arbitrators with whom I have sat do not see the issue as one of
suitability, having a mindset that suitability involves more risk, not less.
They might more clearly see the issue, and the inappropriateness of the
conduct, if the broker's duty were not only to make recommendations
which are suitable but also in the client's best interests.
The reverse suitability issue, though, is a tiny one, on the margin at
best. The reason is that even though they may do so, and the
commissions are much greater, most brokers I know or have met have
little or no interest in hawking more conservative products as, for
example, in selling life insurance. Their first love, and their last love,
tends to be markets, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, exchange-tradedfunds, and options.
Nonetheless, it would do no harm to have the shotgun well-oiled and
loaded but behind the door, so to speak, which adoption of a uniform
fiduciary standard would represent.
C. ComprehensiveIntroductoryDisclosureRequirement

At the commencement of an adviser-client relationship, the adviser
must deliver to the customer an upfront generalized disclosure document
or pamphlet known in the trade as Form ADV. In its Investment
Adviser/Broker Dealer Study, the SEC staff recommended that, as part
of its adoption of a uniform fiduciary standard, the SEC "should
facilitate the provision of uniform, simple and clear disclosures to retail
customers about the terms of their relationships with broker-dealers and
investment advisers, including any material conflicts of interest." 2 5 The
proponents made specific reference to investment adviser requirements:
"the disclosures ... should be provided (a) in a general relationship
guide akin to the new Form ADV Part 2A that advisers deliver at the
unlimited .... Inexperienced traders ... would not be allowed [by some brokerage firms] to place this
type of order." Id. See also Douglas M. Branson, Nibbling at the Edges-Regulation ofShort Selling:
Policing Fails to Deliver and Restoration of an Uptick Rule, 65 Bus. LAW. 67, 77-78 (2009)
(discussing the practice of naked short selling).
125. IA/BD STUDY, supranote 11, at 117 (internal emphasis omitted).
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time of entry into the retail customer relationship ... ."126
Such a required disclosure would not hurt and on the contrary, may
be of some value if brokers are required to disclose the conflicts of
interests in selling proprietary products and in cross-selling, including
not only the extra commissions but the favor with superiors which will
be curried and gained by doing so. Over time, of course, many such
disclosures will degenerate into meaningless boilerplate, at least if SEC
staffers fail adequately to police the waterfront.
VI. CONCLUSION

Too much water has flowed over the damn for it to become a reality
now but the SEC may have been better served by adopting a series of
discrete, specific, and visible rules, such as a reverse suitability rule,
than by adopting an across-the-board uniform standard.127 That is
particularly true as the adoption of an opaque fiduciary duty standard
will not be followed by a flow of cases and opinions as to what the
standard calls for in various sets of circumstances. Instead, application
of the uniform standard will take place after most disputes have
submerged into the arbitration vortex. We may never obtain a good feel
for what the standard requires or what changes its adoption has bought
about.
Much of the effect of a new standard's adoption also will, as
prophylactic, be blunted or neutered altogether by the weakness in
financial services firms' compliance departments. A tension exists
between two inconsistent aims: investor protection, on the one hand, and
designing products, selling products, and making money, on the other,
which exists at every firm. Until the SEC and FINRA figure out how to
raise the stature and therefore effectiveness of brokerage firms'
compliance departments and personnel, a large gap will persist between
the elevated standard on paper and its effect in reality. Conflicts of
interest, abandonment of notions of loyalty, and conduct wholly in
brokers' and firms' rather than customers' interests is, in my opinion,
the prime mover behind the most egregious cases and practices in the
financial services area, as it probably always has been. The emphasis on
cross-selling, on selling proprietary products, and the provision of
significantly higher, alluring commissions, ratchet up the stakes.
Adopted in 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act required the separation of
investment and retail banking. 128 Banks could not sell securities
126. Id.
127. Langevoort, supra note 30, at 445.
128. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). See also Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 637-38 (1971) (holding that the
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products and financial firms could not offer banking services. In 1999,
the Clinton administration caused the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act,
green lighting an unprecedented wave of proprietary investment, selling
The excessive waves of
of proprietary products, and cross-selling.
leverage taken on by large financial firms, motivated by the greed of
their executives, caused three of out the five largest financial firms to
fail and ruined millions of individual investors, causing a near death
experience for many of us.130 So my one alternative to adoption of a
uniform fiduciary standard would be to re-enact the Glass-Steagall Act
or, indeed, a beefed-up version of it. But that is not going to happen. 13 1
Seeing themselves as "Masters of the Universe," financial firms'
executives and lobbyists even are opposing a watered down version of
Glass-Steagall, limiting proprietary investment to no more than 3% of
Tier One (low risk) capital. The financial firms are opposing this
"Volcker Rule" every step of the way and, in my judgment, ultimately
will prevail in watering it down, or eliminating it altogether. It may take
ten years, or even fifteen, but ultimately they will succeed.
So I will return to my original point, made in the introduction: there
exist a number of reasons why. the SEC's adoption of a uniform
fiduciary standard, applicable to broker-dealers as well as to investment
advisers, will not deliver very much. Expect some incremental
improvements from rules the SEC promulgates but don't expect too
much. It may turn out to be little more than a nonevent, "Much Ado
About Nothing."

act prohibits a commercial bank from entering into any arrangement in which it has a "salesman's stake"
in selling securities or securities based products).
129. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
130. See, e.g., LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD & PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF

COMMON SENSE:

THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS (2009). The 3 firms

which failed were Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and, as a practical matter, Merrill Lynch. Of the
"Big 5," only Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs remained standing.
131. But see Michael R. Crittenden, Senators Want to Resurrect Depression-EraCurbs on Risk
Taking,
WALL
ST.
J.
ONLINE
(July
12,
2013),
http://onlinewsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424127887324694904578600053346763038
("[L]awmakers need to keep the gamblers out of our banks by separating traditional bank activities such
as home loans and checking accounts from riskier activities such as trading derivatives and investment
banking." (quoting Sen. Elizabeth Warren) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

